Separate Permit and Workload Identities

Context and Problem Statement

An execution permit authorizes a bounded action against an identified target. A SPIFFE SVID proves the cryptographic identity of a running workload. These statements have different issuers, lifetimes, and authorization semantics.

Considered Options

  • Treat a SPIFFE ID as the permit target identity.

  • Treat the two identities as independent claims and bind them in policy.

Decision Outcome

Chosen option: keep the identities independent. A SPIFFE SVID may authenticate the workload presenting evidence, but it does not replace target identity, hardware scope, operator approval, validity interval, or permitted physical effect.

Consequences

  • Workload authentication and execution authorization can rotate independently.

  • Policy may require an explicit binding between a workload ID and permit subject.

  • The harness cross-checks validated permit facts; signature and SVID validation stay in the external trust boundary.

Confirmation

Authorization tests reject mismatched target identity, scope, digest, signer role, and validity interval. Deployment policy separately validates the SVID.