Separate Permit and Workload Identities¶
Context and Problem Statement¶
An execution permit authorizes a bounded action against an identified target. A SPIFFE SVID proves the cryptographic identity of a running workload. These statements have different issuers, lifetimes, and authorization semantics.
Considered Options¶
Treat a SPIFFE ID as the permit target identity.
Treat the two identities as independent claims and bind them in policy.
Decision Outcome¶
Chosen option: keep the identities independent. A SPIFFE SVID may authenticate the workload presenting evidence, but it does not replace target identity, hardware scope, operator approval, validity interval, or permitted physical effect.
Consequences¶
Workload authentication and execution authorization can rotate independently.
Policy may require an explicit binding between a workload ID and permit subject.
The harness cross-checks validated permit facts; signature and SVID validation stay in the external trust boundary.
Confirmation¶
Authorization tests reject mismatched target identity, scope, digest, signer role, and validity interval. Deployment policy separately validates the SVID.