Supply-Chain Assurance

This document records the actual build assurance of each released component against the SLSA v1.2 Build Track.

GitHub documents artifact attestations from hosted workflows in SLSA v1.0 terms. The project assessment below maps the same controls to the current v1.2 requirements. It is a maintainer assessment, not an independent certification.

Component Table

Component

Source and builder

Provenance

Actual level

Python wheel (.whl)

contracts-vX.Y.Z tag of mmkolpakov/robotics-runtime whose commit is reachable from origin/main; root .github/workflows/release.yml; GitHub-hosted Ubuntu 24.04; uv build --package robotics-runtime-contracts --no-sources

PyPI Trusted Publishing attestations and actions/attest build provenance bound to the artifact digest

Build L2

Source distribution (.tar.gz)

same tag, workflow and build command

same

Build L2

The workspace release workflow builds one package per tag. Both distributions are built and checked once in a job without OIDC authority. The resulting workflow artifact is consumed unchanged by the publication jobs:

  • publish-pypi publishes to PyPI through Trusted Publishing when the repository variable PYPI_PUBLISH_ENABLED is true, using the protected environment pypi;

  • github-release runs only after a successful publish-pypi, attests the distributions, creates the GitHub Release without overwriting existing assets and verifies the immutable release assets.

Both publication jobs have id-token: write: publish-pypi uses it for Trusted Publishing, and github-release uses it for attestations (with attestations: write and contents: write). Neither job checks out the repository or executes project code. No PyPI API token is used or stored. The hosted builder and authentic provenance meet the L2 shape. Build L3 is not claimed because the project does not use and verify an isolated reusable build workflow as its trusted builder boundary.

The repository does not claim a SLSA Source Track level.

Consumer Verification

Download an artifact from the GitHub Release, then verify its attestation:

gh attestation verify \
  robotics_runtime_contracts-<version>-py3-none-any.whl \
  --repo mmkolpakov/robotics-runtime \
  --signer-workflow mmkolpakov/robotics-runtime/.github/workflows/release.yml

The same command applies to the source distribution. Releases up to 0.16 were built by the former mmkolpakov/robotics-runtime-contracts repository and carry that repository’s workflow identity.

Verification establishes artifact identity and build provenance. It does not qualify a robotics runtime, dataset, model, or physical target.

Release Controls

  • Dependencies are resolved from the committed uv.lock.

  • Actions are pinned by immutable commit SHA.

  • Pull requests and main run the package tests on CPython 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14, the compatibility gate against the last release and the workspace consumer checks. The release job itself runs only the release-guard tests.

  • The release job builds the wheel and source distribution without workspace sources and installs each into a clean CPython 3.12 environment.

  • The tag must equal contracts-v followed by the package version (-rc.N for release candidates), resolve to the checked-out commit and be reachable from origin/main.

  • The repository tag ruleset “Immutable package release tags” protects release tags from being moved or deleted.

Any change to the builder boundary, attestation action, release trigger, or artifact set requires updating this table.

Trusted Publisher

PyPI project robotics-runtime-contracts trusts owner mmkolpakov, repository robotics-runtime, workflow release.yml and environment pypi; version 0.18.1 was published through it. Once enabled, a PyPI publication failure fails the release workflow and no GitHub Release is created.

Release robotics-runtime-contracts before releasing a version of robotics-acceptance-harness that depends on it (see docs/releasing.md).